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論文内容の要 ヒ目ー
The recent banking crises that hit , since the last quarter of the year 2008 , several 
developed countries such as the U.K. and the U.S. have confirmed that research topics 
related to the banking economics, and the banking regulation theory in particular, are 
and will always be subjects of high interest in the economic theory. 
The object of this research is to study two interesting subjects highly related to the 
abovementioned fields of research. The first subject of research is related to the regulation 
policy and the credit crunch (part 1). The second subject of research is about the deposit 
insurance design policy and its impact on the extremely sensitive issue of banks' moral 
hazard behavior (part 2). 
This thesis is composed of two separate and independent parts. Each part contains 
two chapters. The empirical analysis in every part is based on the Japanese financial and 
macroeconomic data. 
Hereafter a summary of each part: 
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Part 1- Regulation Policy and Credit Crunch: Evidences from Japan 
The observation of the bank lending statistics in Japan since the beginning of the 
1990s shows that until the last years of this decade the lending growth rate was 
alternating between positive and negative figures (chart 1). However, since the year 1998, 
this' alternation has changed and the year-to-year changes in bank credits have become 
persistently negative for almost five years. The registered figures during these five years 
were even lower than what has been registered in 1997; a year of a severe credit supply 
contraction (i.e., a credit crunch) according to many researches. 
Thus, the question that one can ask is: what is (are) the cause(s) of this severe 
reduction in bank credits in Japan during the period (1999-2005)? The answer to this 
question becomes highly interesting if we know that during the abovementioned period an 
ultra-expansionary monetary policy has been implemented by the Bank of Japan; namely 
the Zero-Interest Rate Policy (the ZIRP) and the Quantitative Easing Policy (the QEP). 
The low availability of bank credits can, evidently, be attributed to whether a weak 
enthusiasm on the part of banks to lend (i.e., supply side factors) or a lower market 
demand for loans (i.e., demand side factors). Note that if the reduction in credits is 
attributed to supply-side factors, such a phenomenon is called by economists a credit 
crunch. 1 In this part of the thesis we are looking to find some answers to the 
abovementioned question. 
Many economists have been interested in bank lending behavior and the credit crunch 
phenomenon, especially after the adoption by many developed countries in 1988 of the 
capital regulation framework of the Basel Accords. Several research works have proven 
that this new framework, the regulatory capital ratio (i.e., the BIS ratio 2) in particular, 
was responsible for the credit crunches (also called capital crunches) occurred in many 
developed countries such as the U.S. in the early 1990s and Japan in 1997 (and to certain 
extent in the early 1990s). On the other hand, some other economists attributed the 
decline in bank credits availability in the U.S. in the early 1990s to a weak demand 
provoked by a recessionary business cycle (Berger and Udell, 1994). 
In this part we build two theoretical lending-supply models; one IS static and the 
other is dynamic. These two models will constitute the theoretical bases on which stand 
the two lending-supply regressions that will be estimated later. Note that we choose to 
work with two types of models because first we want to enhance the credibility of the 
1 Later in this part other definitions of the credit crunch will be provided. 
2 or/and the Tierl ratio. 
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results and second we find in the literature both types of models. 
With regard to the Japanese literature, the methodological contribution of this work 
stands on the test of three credit crunch-hypotheses, all together, instead of just one 
hypothesis, which is the impact of the capital adequacy ratio hypothesis. 
Working on a panel data of Japanese banks throughout the period (1999-2005), the 
estimation results of both models, generally, agree with each other and show that during 
the abovementioned period a credit crunch was taking place and this credit crunch is 
attributed to bankers' precautionary and risk-aversive behavior rather than direct 
regulatory capital worries as it was proven in 1997. 
Indeed, bankers' worries about the risk of bankruptcy In conjunction with managers' 
concerns about their personal specific human capital have, obviously, weakened the 
enthusiasm and the willingness of the Japanese financial intermediaries to grant new 
loans. Several factors can explain such prudent and precautionary lending policy on the 
part of banks during the period of study; namely: 1) the strengthening of the regulatory 
environment after the adoption in 1998 of the prompt corrective action (the PCA) and the 
subsequent reinforcement of the legal pursuit measures that aim to clarify the liability of 
the executives of failed financial institutions, 2) the expected toughening in fund raising 
after the lift of the full coverage of all types of deposits projected to be in 2001,3 3) the 
abatement of the moral hazard problem in the system after allowing some financial 
institutions previously considered as too-big-to-fail to bankrupt I and 4) the non-stop 
shrink in asset prices. 
Part 2 - The Deposit Insurance and the Risk-Shifting Incentive: Temporary Blanket 
Deposit Insurance as a Natural Experiment 
As the world has undergone an unprecedented financial cnSIS, there are ongOlng 
discussions on regulatory reforms that are centered at the risk based capital adequacy 
standard and the deposit insurance system. The general directions of the reforms are a 
tougher regulatory framework including a higher minimum capital adequacy standard and 
a greater and broader protection of deposits. As for the deposit insurance system, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) of the United States, for instance, 
increased the deposit insurance cap per depositor per institution from 100 thousand dollars 
to 250 thousand dollars temporarily through December 2010. These recent regulatory 
reforms motivate us to explore what policy mix is desirable. 
::l Later this date was postponed by one year. 
4 The Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed on November 1997···etc. 
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The greater insurance protection is aimed at relieving poorly informed depositors, who 
might panic in the wake of negative rumors about their banks during the crisis, and 
preventing unnecessary withdrawals and therefore potential failure of solvent banks. 
There is, however, a broad consensus that the negative side effect of the publicly run 
deposit insurance is a danger of the moral hazard problem; insured banks' excessive risk 
taking 5. The policy discussions built on the theoretical consensus warn us of the 
seriousness of the moral hazard problem embedded in the deposit insurance. For example, 
"The Core Principle for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems" published recently in June, 
2009 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision states, "Moral hazard should be 
mitigated by ensuring that the deposit insurance system contains appropriate design 
features and through other elements of the financial system safety net" (Principle 2). The 
modern day publicly run deposit insurance is known for its flat premium. The risk profile 
of the premium that the public insurer charges banks is flatter than that of the 
actuarially fair premium that the private insurer would charge in absence of the public 
insurer. The premium is sometimes perfectly flat so that the premium is independent of 
an insured bank's risk. Thus, insured banks' shareholders are willing to take greater risks 
to pursue higher returns. 
The considerable empirical literature has evolved to assess the impact of the deposit 
insurance system on banks' risk taking. Their results are mixed (Grossman, 1992; Brewer 
and Mondschean, 1994; Brewer, 1995; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995; Karels and McClatchey 
1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Hooks and Robinson, 2002; Hovakimian et 
al., 2003; Gropp and Vesala, 2004; Wagster, 2007; and Ioannidou and Penas, 2009). We 
extend the literature by examining the impact of the temporary blanket deposit insurance 
on banks' risk taking in Japan, a large bank centered economy. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the acceleration of 
the moral hazard incentive of banks protected by the blanket deposit insurance. Japan is 
a desirable testing ground for the moral hazard hypothesis also because the Insurance 
premium has been perfectly flat. If a bank in Japan during the blanket coverage era were 
not to exploit the deposit insurance, what other banks would do so? 
Some studies discuss that, in presence of asymmetric information that lies between a 
bank and the insurer, the risk sensitive actuarially fair pricing of the deposit insurance is 
infeasible or suboptimal (Chan et aI, 1992; Freixas and Rochet, 1995). Other studies 
5 For the review of the theoretical literature on the relationship between the deposit insurance system 
and insured banks' risk taking, see Gropp and Vesala (2004). An excellent read on this subject is Freixas 
and Rochet (2008). 
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argue that available regulatory tools help improve the functioning of the deposit insurance 
system. An insured bank's moral hazard incentive is restrained when the regulator is 
tough enough to discipline the bank (Grossman, 1992; Hovakimian and Kane, 2000). The 
optimal premium depends on a bank's capital adequacy, which is a publicly observable 
measure for a bank's solvency that is employed as a regulatory yardstick in the modern 
day prudential regulation (Bond and Crocker, 1993). In light of these discussions, we 
explore whether and how the prudential regulation is relevant to the well functioning of 
the deposit insurance. 
Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan, a government funded deposit insurer in Japan 
modeled after the FDIC was established in Japan in July, 1971. The present shape of the 
deposit insurance system characterized by the flat rate and the coverage up to ten million 
yen of deposits was established in July 1986. Notably, there was, however, a period of 
temporary unlimited blanket insurance coverage. 6 As part of a policy package to combat 
the financial crisis that plagued the banking industry as a whole, the cap at ten million 
yen was abandoned for almost six years from June 1996 to March 2002. Under the full 
protection of the flat rate based insurance, banks should have had a greater incentive to 
gamble. We use the lift of the insurance cap as a natural experiment. Our primary goal 
IS to investigate whether this lift induced Japanese banks to excessive risk taking. 7 
The lift of the deposit insurance cap is followed by the tougher regulatory action 
framework known as the Prompt Corrective Action (the PCA) that mandates regulatory 
interventions to a poorly capitalized bank. We are interested in whether the regulatory 
discipline by PCA mitigates the risk-shifting incentive of insured banks if the incentive 
exists at all. 
Following Duan et al (1992), Hovakimian and Kane (2000), Hovakimian et al. (2003) 
and Wagster (2007, 2008), we test the so-called risk-shifting hypothesis; the hypothesis 
that an insured bank shifts its risk to the deposit insurer, which is one form of the moral 
hazard hypothesis. Using the daily stock prices and semiannual balance sheets of all listed 
Japanese banks, for each bank, we compute the semiannual actuarially fair insurance 
premIum per unit of JPY (henceforth, the IPP) , which represents what a bank would 
6 A temporary blanket insurance of deposits is a widely adopted policy during the period of CrISIS. 
Many crisis-hit countries indeed adopt the blanket guarantees of bank debts beyond deposits. See Laeven 
and Valencia (2008) for the list of blanket bank debt guarantee episodes including the blanket deposit 
Insurance. 
Imai (2006) uses the end of the blanket insurance as a natural experiment to study its effect on the 
sensitivity of rates and quantity of deposits on a bank's default risk and finds that the end of the 
blanket insurance yielded the greater discipline of banks by depositors. Fueda and Konishi (2007) also 
find the greater depositor discipline after the reinstatement of the insurance cap. 
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have to pay as an insurance premium per dollar of deposits if the deposit insurance were 
priced in an actually fair manner. The IPP is understood to represent the value of the 
deposit insurance to a bank's shareholders. The major test is based on the relationship 
between a bank's IPP and the volatility of the market value of a bank's assets derived 
using the option pricing formula. When the actual premium is fixed, the bank is taking 
advantage of the flat rate based deposit insurance if a bank's actuarially fair premium 
increases with its overall asset risk. This is because the greater asset risk of a bank is 
reflected on the fair value of the deposit insurance but is not on the fixed rate premium. 
Our methodological contribution hinges on the unique episode of the introduction of 
the PCA in Japan that allows us clean tests of effects of the interaction of the deposit 
insurance with the regulatory discipline on banks' risk taking behavior. The PCA was 
introduced to banks that the regulator allowed to operate internationally (international 
banks) and then was extended to banks that the regulator allowed to operate only 
domestically (domestic banks), one year later. Since the timing of adoption of the PCA is 
not uniform across banks, the effects of distinct regulatory regimes, notably regimes of 
the limited insurance coverage, the blanket coverage with PCA and the blanket coverage 
without PCA are not identified with macroeconomic developments or other relevant policy 
changes that would coincide regulatory regimes we examine if the PCA were introduced 
to insured banks all at once. In the abovementioned literature that directly tests the 
risk-shifting incentive, comparisons are made between different periods of time associated 
with different regulatory regimes. In other words, banks' risk taking behavior is assumed 
to change all at once. Effects captured by such time dummies may be those of 
macroeconomiC developments or policy changes other than changes in prudential 
regulatory regimes. Using regime dummies that are not the indicators of certain time 
periods for all the sample banks can isolate effects of regulatory regimes from other 
effects. 
Our major findings are five. First, banks that are insured by the flat rate based 
deposit insurance are engaged in risk-shifting regardless of the lllsurance coverage. 
Second, banks with a greater asset risk, however, tend to restrain risk taking by reducing 
leverage. It is the weaker restraining effect of deleveraging that induces a greater extent 
of risk-shifting by fully insured banks. Third, the blanket insurance that did not 
accompany the PCA accelerated banks' risk-shifting, whereas the blanket insurance with 
the PCA did not. Fourth, fully insured banks that pertained to the PCA had less moral 
hazard incentives than not only fully insured banks that did not pertain to the PCA but 
also partially insured banks not having been subject to the PCA. Fifth, poorly capitalized 
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banks that generally have a greater risk-shifting incentive did not have such an incentive 
when both the blanket coverage and the PCA were in action. These findings suggest that 
the blanket deposit insurance is undoubtedly a source of the moral hazard incentive but 
that its incentive can be restrained by well functioning regulators. 
論文審査結果の要旨
Brahim G UIZANI の提出論文は、日本における銀行規制政策と銀行行動に関する実証研究であ
り、第一部 (r銀行規制と貸し渋り:日本からの証拠J) では、 1999年度以降の日本の銀行規制施策
と銀行の信用供給行動との関係を扱い、第二部 (r預金保険と危険シフト誘因:自然の実験として
の全額保証預金保険期J) では預金保険と銀行のモラルハザードとの関係を扱っている。
第一部では、日本の銀行貸出が2000年 3 月から下降線を辿った原因につき、銀行による信用供与
に関する三つの仮説(適正資本比率仮説、自主的危険軽減仮説、集中的規制監督仮説)を、三つの
指標(リスクベース (BIS ， Tier I)資本比率、簿価ベース (BBCR) 資本比率、不良債券比率)
を同時に考慮、して検討した。結果、静学モデル、動学モデルのいずれの推計からも、簿価ベース資
本比率の影響が支配的であることが判明した。これは当該期間には既に政府の指導によってリスク
ベース資本比率指標の信頼度が向上していたことを勘案すると意外な発見であり、銀行の与信行動
を左右するのは、銀行が BIS の定める資本比率規制を遵守しようとする動機ばかりではなく、む
しろ銀行が破綻の危険を回避しようとする動機が重要なことを示唆している。
第二部では、日本の預金保険のペイオフ解禁前の全額保証の時期に注目し、保証が全額か否かが、
銀行がリスクを預金保険機構に押しつけようとするモラル・ハザード傾向に及ぼす影響、そこでの
早期是正措置 (PCA) の影響を検討した。銀行が本来支払うべき(リスクに見合った)プレミア
ムをオプション価格理論に基つeき算出し、これと実際に課される(リスクを反映しな L 、)定額プレ
ミアムとの差の動向に注目した。結果、全額保証期にはモラル・ハザード行動が強まったこと、但
し早期是正措置時期の銀行にはモラル・ハザードの傾向の強化はほとんど認められないことを初め
て実証した。
以上の理論研究および実証研究は先行研究の一定の理解に基づき、新しい知見ないし貢献を付け
加えているものであり、今後に独立して研究活動に携わる為の資質を示している。
よって本論文の審査の結果、博士(経済学)として合格であるとする。
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